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Abstract
In this thesis, a new protocol is proposed for the Bluetooth Key Exchange. The
proposed key exchange will make use of a public-key algorithm as compared to
the currently existing key exchange which only uses symmetric ciphers. The
public-key algorithm to be used is a modified version of the RSA algorithm called
"Unbalanced RSA". The proposed scheme will improve on the currently existing
key exchange scheme by improving the security while trying to minimize
computation time. The proposed protocol will also improve on a recent work
which used the Diffie-Hellman algorithm for Bluetooth key exchange. In using the
Diffie-Hellman algorithm the security was increased from the original Bluetooth
key exchange but the computation time and difficulty of computations was also
increased. Two Bluetooth devices that are trying to communicate can have a
wide range of processor speeds and the use of the Diffie-Hellman protocol can
cause a large delay at one user. The use of Unbalanced RSA in the proposed
protocol will aim to remedy this problem. The aim of the proposed protocol is to
eliminate the security risks from the original Bluetooth key exchange and also
address the computation time issue with the enhanced Diffie-Hellman key
exchange.
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1. Introduction
Wireless network communication has been paid more and more attention
during the past decade since it makes it much easier to access a network
compared to its wired counterparts. On one hand, wireless networks can provide
great convenience for the people in communication; one the other hand, it
proposes a tougher task of network security since it also make it much easier for
an attacker to intercept a message transmitted in wireless. There are many types
of wireless networks, for example, wireless LAN (WLAN), wireless MAN (WMAN),
wireless PAN (WPAN), and ad hoc wireless network. In this thesis, the security of
WPAN is our main concern.
In recent years the Wireless Personal Area Network or WPAN has
become a popular method for two devices in close proximity to exchange
information. The WPAN consists of technologies such as Infrared (IR), Bluetooth,
UWB, and Zigbee. When PAN first became popular IR technology was the
popular way to exchange information between two wireless devices [1]. Infrared
technology uses wireless technology in devices that convey data through IR
radiation. IR technology is used for short and medium range communication.
Many devices operate in the "line-of-sight mode", which means that the two
devices must have a straight line of sight between them. This is not very helpful
for people who are always on the move. Another mode for infrared devices is
called the scatter mode where a device does not have to be in direct sight of the
device but has to be in the same room or just outside the room with a door open.
Another limitation of IR technology is that its signal cannot pass through walls so
it cannot communicate between two different rooms in a house. Nowadays
Infrared is being phased out of devices in exchange for Bluetooth (BT)
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technology. BT technology improves on the mobility of infrared devices by
allowing users to be farther away and in different rooms when they are
exchanging information. Bluetooth can allow devices to be up to 100 meters
away and still be able to connect to one another [2]. It also allows for a data
transmission rate of up to 3 megabits per second. Overall, Bluetooth is a good
solution to the problems faced by infrared technologies and that is why it is taking
over as the predominant technology for wireless file transfer.
Over the past few years the number of Bluetooth users has increased
rapidly. From 2003 to 2006, the number of Bluetooth users has nearly doubled
every year going from 125 million to 1 billion users as predicted by the November
2006 issue of SDA magazine and [3]. The number of Bluetooth equipped devices
keeps increasing. In 2009, 80% of mobile phones will be Bluetooth enabled [4].
According to Microsoft, in 2008, greater than 54% of all laptops that are shipped
are equipped with Bluetooth technology. As of right now Bluetooth is not really
being used for exchanging very vital information. As more powerful devices
become equipped with Bluetooth, it will be used to exchange important
information and therefore there needs to be no uncertainty in the security of
Bluetooth. Bluetooth security right now is acceptable for the way it is being used
but as Bluetooth is being used to exchange secretive information, the security
needs to be improved.
Security in Bluetooth is a major issue and failure to use proper security
measures can cause several problems for Bluetooth users. First of all, the
Bluetooth standard describes three modes of security which are shown in Table
1.1 [5]. Modes 2 and 3 require two devices to complete the pairing process
whereas mode 1 does not require it.
Security Mode

Description

1

No Security.

2

Service Level Security.

3

Link Level Security.
Table 1.1: Bluetooth Security Modes
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Failure to employ a proper mode of security can lead to several vulnerabilities in
the Bluetooth device. These vulnerabilities are listed below [5]:
•

Sensitive data is available for browsing

•

An attacker can use a compromised telephone to make calls

•

Denial of Service attacks can be launched against the compromised
device

•

Address lists can be downloaded

•

Malware can be installed for later infection of other devices, including
network attached systems

•

An attacker can install malware with the intent to gain ongoing control of
the device

To combat these vulnerabilities several different approaches can be taken.
First of all one should not operate Bluetooth Devices in Mode 1 because no
security is provided. Also when Bluetooth is not being used, turn it off so that it is
not discoverable. Turn it on when trying to connect to somebody. An easy way to
ensure that the device is safe is to minimize the distance between it and the other
Bluetooth device. It is also a good idea to install anti-virus software to keep you
safe from Malware. These Bluetooth vulnerabilities have already been addressed
and users for the most part are aware of them and can combat them. Some types
of attacks on Bluetooth however use complex methods to obtain confidential
information. These attacks are known as passive eavesdropping, active
eavesdropping, and bluedumping. These attacks occur during the key exchange
operation and obtain the link keys so that the attacker can decrypt all information
sent form one device to the other. In [6] the author agrees that eavesdropping
attacks are a major problem in current Bluetooth security. The key exchange
scheme proposed in this Thesis will help to fight against these attacks.
The scheme proposed in this Thesis uses public-key cryptography during
the Bluetooth key exchange to provide better security while also trying to
minimize the time delay. The proposed scheme will help to protect against the
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common key exchange attacks of passive eavesdropping, active eavesdropping,
and bluedumping because of the use of public-key cryptography. The proposed
algorithm uses a slightly modified version of the RSA algorithm which has
considerably smaller time delay than other public-key algorithms while still
providing a high level of security.
The next chapter reviews the existing Bluetooth Privacy and key exchange
schemes. Chapter 3 revisits previously proposed work on the Bluetooth key
exchange using public-key cryptography. Chapter 4 reviews the RSA algorithm,
and introduces a modified version of RSA known as "Unbalanced RSA". The new
protocol using Unbalanced RSA is proposed in chapter 5. This chapter will also
discuss the security aspects of the proposed protocol. Chapter 6 will go over in
detail the simulation results and also provides analysis on these results.
Conclusions and ideas for future work are given in the final chapter.
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2. An Overview on Bluetooth
Privacy and Key Exchange
IEEE 802.15 is a working group of the IEEE 802, which specializes in
Wireless Personal Area Networks. This chapter focuses on the security portion of
the IEEE 802.15 standard and more specifically on the Key exchange.

2.1 An Overview of Bluetooth
Bluetooth was created by Ericsson in 1994 to essentially replace wired
networks. In 1998 another step was taken and a Bluetooth special interest group
(SIG) was formed, the founders were from Ericsson, IBM, Intel, Toshiba and
Nokia [7]. By the year 2004 Bluetooth was already supported by over 2100
companies all over the world [8]. Bluetooth allows devices to connect and
exchange information without any wires or external devices. The only
requirement is that the device is Bluetooth enabled. Bluetooth has many different
uses and is used in a variety of devices such as cell phones, laptops, printers,
headsets, video games etc. The introduction of Bluetooth has been quite
revolutionary and actually helps people in everyday life. The use of Bluetooth
enabled headsets, allows people to connect the headset to their phone so they
can take calls even while driving without getting distracted from the road.
Bluetooth does of course have a limited range and the range is not that of a
WLAN. However, depending on the class of the device being used the range can
be quite good. For example, for a Bluetooth headset, a large range is not
required therefore a class 2 or 3 device can be used which can provide up to 10
meter range. However, for a laptop, a larger range is required so a class 1 device
with 100m range would be appropriate [9]. Prior to Bluetooth, Infrared technology

5

was commonly used to exchange information between two wireless devices. This
technology proved to be quite rudimentary when compared to Bluetooth. With IR
technology, the two devices usually had to have a direct line of sight to one
another or there couldn't be any walls or other obstacles between them [10].
Once Bluetooth was introduced IR technology was quickly faded out.
Another wireless service that has constantly been compared to Bluetooth
is Wireless internet (WLAN). Wireless internet or Wi-Fi is very common these
days and is standard in laptops. Bluetooth is different from Wi-Fi in that it does
not require any external products in order to be used. The only requirement is
that the two devices have the Bluetooth technology and can connect to one
another and exchange information. The similarity between Bluetooth and Wi-Fi is
that they are both used in households and offices. Wi-Fi covers a wider range
than Bluetooth, whereas Bluetooth is less expensive and has lower power
consumption [11]. In general, Bluetooth is efficient for exchanging small files or
documents when two devices are in close proximity of one another.
Security concerns play a major role in Bluetooth technology. The goal of
Bluetooth security is to allow devices to connect to one another and/or exchange
information without being compromised. In the early years of Bluetooth, there
were some very lethal attacks such as bluejacking, bluesnarfing, or bluebugging
which enabled attackers to use the Bluetooth device without the user's
knowledge [12]. However, security patches have been used to remedy these
problems [13]. In recent years Bluetooth security has become a more serious
issue as it is being used to exchange confidential information. The main issue is
the key exchange process where an attacker can use passive/active
eavesdropping or bluedumping attack to obtain secret keys. Once an attacker is
able to obtain the secret keys he/she will be able to decrypt all information being
sent between the two Bluetooth devices. These attacks will be discussed in a
later section and how they can be used to obtain the secret keys. The next
section will go over the initial stages of Bluetooth security. The third section will
review the Bluetooth key exchange process as well as the attacks possible on the
key exchange.
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2.2 Bluetooth Security
The Bluetooth Security process consists of Key generation and
Initialization followed by encrypting and sending of messages. The initialization
process is the fundamental base of Bluetooth security because that is where the
secret keys are created and exchanged. The focus of this thesis will be on the
first three parts of the initialization process and more specifically the key
exchange. The initialization process consists of five steps [14]:
1) generation of initialization key
2) generation of link key
3) link key exchange
4) authentication
5) generation of encryption key
The first three steps of the initialization process make up the key exchange and
that is where the main focus will be. Prior to discussing the initialization process a
brief discussion on Bluetooth security services will be provided.

2.2.1 Security Services
Bluetooth provides five different kinds of security services using different
kinds of mechanisms. The five security services provided by Bluetooth are
authentication, access control, data confidentiality, data integrity, and nonrepudiation. Authentication is provided through a challenge-response scheme in
which the claimant is asked to prove its knowledge of the secret key using a
symmetric cipher. The authentication procedure uses the AES candidate
SAFER+ as its base and modifies it to fit the needs of Bluetooth [14]. Access
control is provided to Bluetooth through the use of PIN numbers entered in the
devices. When two devices are trying to connect to one another it is required that
they each enter the same PIN in their devices so that it is known that these
devices want to be matched with one another. If the same PINs are not entered
into the devices they will not be allowed to connect to one another. Data
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confidentiality is provided through an encryption scheme. The encryption of the
payload information is done by a stream cipher. The key stream generator will
generate and stream through the key which will then be XORed with the plain text
or cipher text depending on whether encryption or decryption is being performed.
In order to make sure data integrity is maintained Bluetooth has many error
codes which will occur if there is any problem with the two devices that are trying
to communicate. These error codes are used to inform the parties if the message
could not be delivered for some reason. The errors will let the parties know what
problem has occurred so that they can fix it and resend the data. The unique
address of each Bluetooth device provides accountability in terms of the last
security service, non-repudiation.

2.2.2 Key Types
There are four different key types that can be used as an authentication
key, encryption key, or initialization key. The four different key types [14] are 1)
Combination key (K1-2, K2-i), Unit Key (Kunit), Temporary Key (Kmaster), and
Initialization key (Kit1it). The unit key Kunit is derived solely from information from
Bluetooth Device 1. The combination Key is derived from information in both
Bluetooth Device 1 (BD1) and Bluetooth Device 2 (BD2). The master key Kmaster
will be used during the session currently in progress and it will replace the original
link key temporarily. The initialization key is used during the initialization process
before any combination or unit keys have been defined or exchanged.
Initialization key is derived from a PIN code and a device address. The PIN can
be a fixed number that came with the device or can be selected by the user and
entered into both devices that are trying to connect to one another.

2.2.3 Key Generation
For authentication purposes there are two different algorithms used for
generating keys. In figure 2.1 both these algorithms are shown as well as their
inputs and outputs. When trying to generate a unit key or combination key the E21
function is used, this will produce a 128-bit key using a 128-bit random number
8

and 48-bit address. When trying to generate an initialization key or a master key
the E22 function is used, this will produce a 128-bit key from a 128-bit random
number and an L octet user PIN.
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Figure 2.1: BT Key Generating Algorithm E2 [14]

Figure 2.2 shows how the encryption key is generated using the E3 algorithm.
The E3 algorithm produces 128-bit key using a 128-bit random number, a 96-bit
Cipher offset, and the 128-bit link key.
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128 - "
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Figure 2.2: Generation of BT encryption key [14]
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2.2.4 Initialization Key
The initialization key is generated using the E22 algorithm. This algorithm
takes as input the device address, PIN code, length of PIN (in octets), and a
random number. During each authentication process a new random number will
be issued to provide better security. It is also possible to do mutual authentication
so that each device knows exactly who it is communicating with. Once a
successful authentication has been completed an auxiliary parameter, the
authenticated ciphering offset (ACO) will be computed and the ACO will be used
for ciphering key generation.

2.2.5 Unit Key
To generate a unit key the only information that is needed is from
Bluetooth Device 1 (BD1). Figure 2.3 below shows how BD1 will send the unit
key to BD2 so that they can communicate with each other. As can be seen from
the figure, BD1 will generate Kunit and then XOR with the initialization key so that
Kunit is not transported in the clear. Although this is a very simple encryption it
does provide some type of security. Once the encrypted key reaches BD2, it will
decrypt the key by XORing it with the initialization key to obtain Kunit, which
means that this key will always be used by BD2 when it is trying to communicate
with BD1.
Kfc

K.nit

K*,

• ^

-* K,nit

Figure 2.3: Generation of BT Unit Key [14]
2.2.6 Combination Key
When generating a combination key it is slightly more complicated than
generating a unit key because both Bluetooth Device 1 (BD1) and Bluetooth
Device 2 (BD2) need to be involved in the generation and they both need the
10

others information. Figure 2.4 below gives a diagrammed version of the steps
that need to be taken in order to create a combination key K1-2. Firstly, BD1 will
create its part of the combination key AK_Ki by inputting a random number
(AK_RANDi) and the address of BD1 (BD_ADDR1) into the E21 algorithm. Once
BD1 has created A K J ^ it will create C1 by XORing AK_RAND! and the
initialization key. Once this is completed BD1 will send C1 to BD2. On the other
side BD2 will be calculating AK_K 2 and C2 using another random number
(AK_RAND2), device address of BD2 (BD_ADDR2), and the initialization key
(Kinit). Once BD2 completes its calculations it will send C2 to device BD1. Once
BD1 receives C 2 it can calculate AK_RAND 2 by taking C2 and XORing it with Kinit.
Now that BD1 knows AK_RAND 2 it can calculate AK_K 2 by putting AK_RAND 2
and BD_ADDR2 into the E2i algorithm. BD1 now has AK_K2, it can calculate the
combination key which is done by XORing AK_Ki with AK_K 2 to obtain K-i-2.
Device B does exactly the same thing to calculate AK_Ki and then it will XOR
AK_Ki and AK_K2 to obtain K2_i which is the same as Ki_2. The combination key
is by far the commonly used method to obtain a Bluetooth link key.

BDl

BD2

AK_Ki=E 2 ,(AK_RAND,, BD_ADDR,)
Q = AK_RANDi XOR K ^

AK_K 2 =E 2 i(AK_RAND 2 , BD_ADDR 2 )
C2 = AK_RAND 2 XOR KM,
AK_RAND 2 = C2 XOR Kinit
AK_K 2 =E 2 i(AK_RAND2, BD_ADDR2)
Ki_2 = AK_Ki XOR AK_K 2

A K _ R A N D I = Ci XOR K

AK_Ki=E 2 i(AK_RAND A , B D _ A D D R A )

K 2 .I = AK_Ki XOR AK_I<2 = K1.2

Figure 2.4: Generation of BT Combination Key [14]

11

2.2.7 Master/Temporary Key
The process for generating a master key for the current session is a little
bit simpler than that for a combination key. When the master (BD1) wants to
create a master key and deliver it to BD2 it follows the steps outlined in Figure
2.5 below. The figure shows that Bluetooth Device 1 will first calculate Kmaster by
using the E22 algorithm with inputs of 2 random numbers and the length of the
random number in octets. The next step is for BD1 to send a random number to
BD2. This number is used to calculate a value called the overlay, which is
obtained by inputting the link key, the random number and the length of the
random number into the E22 algorithm. BD1 will also calculate this overlay and
then the overlay and the master key will be XORed together to form C. The value
C will be sent to BD2 and it can now XOR the overlay it calculated with the value
C that was sent in order to obtain Kmaster.
BDl

BD2

Kmas,er = E22(RAND1,RAND2,16)
OVL = E22(K,RAND,16)
OVL = E22(K,RAND,16)
C = OVLXORK master
K „ B = OVLXORC

Figure 2.5: Generation of BT Master Key [14]
2.3 Bluetooth Key exchange
The Bluetooth key exchange combines the first three steps of the key
generation and initialization process. It includes the generation of an initialization
key by both devices, the generation of link keys, and the exchange of link keys.
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Figure 2.6 shows these three steps together in one diagram. This is the entire
process which will be replaced with the proposed protocol.

BT Device 1
Enters P I N

Generates Rink-RND
Kini, = E22(Rini., PIN, L)

BT Device 2
Enters PIN

Ki n i t =E 2 2 (Ri n i t ,PIN ! L)

Generates R i = R N D
CA — Ri X O R Kinit

Generates R 2 =RND
C B = R 2 XOR Kinit

R2—C2 X O R Kinit
Ki=E 2 i(Ri, IDBD1)
K 2 =E 2 i(R2, IDBD2)
K1.2 = Ki X O R K 2

Ri—Oi XOR K n it
K 2 =E 2 1 (RAND 2 , IDBD2)
Ki=E2i(Ri, IDBD1)
Jv2-i

=

^-1 -X.OK. 1V2

Figure 2.6: Bluetooth Key Exchange
The first step in the Bluetooth key exchange scheme is for the two users to
enter the agreed upon PIN into each of their respective devices. Once the PINs
have been entered into the devices, the two devices connect to one another.
These two devices will be called Bluetooth Device 1 (BD1) and Bluetooth device
2 (BD2). BD1 will generate a random number Rinit using a random number
generator. Rinit will be used to generate the initialization key. Once BD1 generates
Rinit it will send it to BD2. Now that both devices have Rinit they can calculate the
initialization key (Kinit) using the E22 function. The input to the E22 function will be
the Rinit, PIN, and L (length of PIN), which will produce the output Kinit- Once both
devices have obtained the Kinit they have to begin the process for exchanging the
Link Key. BD1 and BD2 will generate the random numbers R1 and R2
respectively. The next steps are almost the same as generating a combination
key. BD1 and BD2 will generate C1 and C2 respectively by XORing the
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initialization key with the random numbers they generated. BD1 will then send Ci
to BD2 and BD2 will send C2 to BD1. Using C2, BD1 will obtain R2 and similarly
BD2 will obtain Ri. Both devices now have Ri and R2 as well as IDBD1 and
IDBD2. They each generate Ki (Ki=E2i(Ri, IDBD1)) and K2 (K2=E2i(R2, IDBD2)).
By XORing Ki and K2, they have each obtained the shared link key.

2.3.1 Attacks on Bluetooth Key Exchange
In the early years of Bluetooth technology, several flaws were found in its
implementation. These flaws were known as bluejacking, bluesnarfing, and
bluebugging. Bluejacking is the sending of unwanted messages through
Bluetooth to Bluetooth-enabled devices such as mobile phones and laptops [15].
Bluesnarfing allows users to access the information on a wireless device through
a Bluetooth connection. Bluebugging allows a user to take control of the victim's
Bluetooth enabled phone to make calls or send text messages. Bluesnarfing and
Bluejacking are illegal in most countries and these attacks are usually only
possible on older Bluetooth-enabled devices as the newer devices have updated
software to avoid these problems.
Although these problems were of concern back then they have for the
most part been taken care of. However, there is still one major problem that
needs to be addressed. This major problem is the transfer of confidential
information. With the pairing scheme in place right now, it would not be difficult
for a person to eavesdrop (passively or actively) on a connection between two
Bluetooth devices and obtain the link key. In [16] it was noted that Bluetooth had
three major vulnerabilities: 1) Spoofing through keys, 2) Spoofing through
address, and 3) PIN Length. The key exchange plays a major role in trying to
counter these vulnerabilities and with the system in place now it is not too difficult
to attack. In [17], [18], [19], [20] it is documented the use of only a PIN as secret
entity is not sufficient to provide total security and a better pairing scheme is
needed. In the near future it will be necessary for Bluetooth to provide better
security.
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Passive Eavesdropping
If a person is trying to send confidential information through Bluetooth, a
passive eavesdropper would only need to find out the PIN both devices are using
in order to be able to decrypt the messages being sent back and forth. Let's start
at the very beginning. In order for the two devices to connect they need to
establish a PIN that they both enter into their devices. Usually these PINs are 4
digit numbers and therefore are not that difficult to figure out. If an eavesdropper
is able to obtain this PIN he can follow through all the Bluetooth security steps to
obtain the encryption key that is going to be used. A figure of a passive
eavesdropping attack is shown in Figure 2.7.

BT Device 1
Enters PIN

BT Device 2
Enters PIN

Connected

BTAttacker
Generates Ri n it=RND
K init = E22(Rini,, PIN, L)

Rin

Ric

Kinit =E 22 (R at tk, PIN, L)

Generates R i = R N D
CA = R I X O R Kinit

Generates R 2 = R N D
CB —R2 X O R Knit
Ci

R2=C2XORKini,
Ki=E2i(Ri,ADDRi)
K 2 =E 2 i(R 2 ,ADDR 2 )
K1-2 = Ki X O R K 2

Ri=C,XORKi„it
K 2 =E 2 1 (R 2 ,ADDR 2 )
Ki=E2i(Ri,ADDRi)
K2.1 = Ki X O R K 2

Figure 2.7: Passive eavesdropping attack on Bluetooth Key exchange
The steps an eavesdropper would use are as follows:
1. Obtain PIN by guess or obtaining from use
2. intercept random number sent from one Bluetooth device to another
3. Use random number to derive initialization key through the E22 function
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4. Use initialization key and combination key format to obtain random
numbers from both Bluetooth device users
5. Use random numbers to derive the portions of the authentication key
from both users (AK_K=E2i(RAND, ADDR))
6. Use AK_Ki and AK_K2 to obtain the link key (K|ink = AK_Ki XOR
AK_K2)
7. eavesdroppers can put link key through authentication scheme to
obtain SRES and compare it with the SRES of the Bluetooth devices
8. The link key is then put through E3 function along with the COF and a
random number to obtain the ciphering key
9. The ciphering key is input to the payload key generator
10. The payload key is then input to the key stream generator and the key
stream is generated
11. The eavesdropper can now use the key stream and XOR it with the
cipher text to obtain all the plaintext.

Active Eavesdropping
An active eavesdropper is similar to a passive eavesdropper with one
exception; an active eavesdropper will actually go in and alter messages being
sent from one user to the other. An active eavesdropper will alter messages so
that it seems as though the BT users are communicating with the right person but
actually there is an attacker intercepting their messages and altering them. Figure
2.8 below shows that two Bluetooth devices are trying to create a combination
key. However there is an attacker intercepting the messages and altering them to
make it seem like the two devices are still communicating with each other. This
type of attack is also known as the man-in-the-middle attacks.
In this scheme the attacker starts intercepting the messages after the PINs
are entered by both users. As the diagram shows, every message that is
supposed to go from Device 1 to Device 2 is intercepted by the attacker and the
attacker then sends its own message to device 2. Same thing happens when
device 2 is sending a message to device 1. All the items that are bolded and
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italicized in the figure are the ones that are manipulated by the attacker. The
figure shows that the two Bluetooth devices still believe they are speaking to the
correct person without any interference because they are receiving the proper
messages. The attacker is the only device with all the proper values and at the
end after the attacker performs the same process on authentication he/she will be
able to decrypt any messages exchanges between Device 1 and Device 2. This
attack also ensures that any message sent from device 1 to device 2 will not be
decrypted by device 2 since it did not receive the proper values during key
exchange. In passive eavesdropping however, device 2 is still able to decrypt the
messages sent by device 1 because none of the information during key
exchange had been altered.

BT Device 1

BT Device 2

Enters PIN

BT
Generates Rinit=RND
Ki„i, = E22(Rimt, PIN, L)

Enters PIN

Connected

Rin

Attacker
Rai
J fir™>=E 2 2(^„i,PIN,L)

Generates R2=RND
CB =R 2 XOR KM,

Generates R i = R N D
CA=RiXORKinit

C1

'attk

'attk
R-2 — Cattk X O R Kinit
Ki=E21(R,,ADDR,)
K2-^2\{R.2, ADDR2)
K1-2 = Ki X O R K2

RI — Cattk X O R Kjxut

K2=E21(R2,ADDR2)
A}=E21(Rattk,ADDR,)
K2.i=KjXORK2

Figure 2.8: Man-in-the-middle attack on BT Key Exchange

Passive and Active Eavesdropping (bluedumping)
A combination of passive and active eavesdropping is called bluedumping.
This attack causes a Bluetooth device to unload its stored link key to a specific
device, which forces these two devices to perform their key exchange and
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therefore the attacker has another opportunity to eavesdrop and obtain the pairs
link key [21]. The process of this attack is quite simple. The attacker will send one
of the Bluetooth devices a message claiming to be another device and claiming
to have lost the pairs link key. Once the Bluetooth device receives this message,
it will reinitiate the key exchange with the other Bluetooth device. This will give
the attacker an opportunity to see the messages and obtain the link key. Again
this attack does depend on the attacker being able to obtain the PIN that is
entered into both BT devices.

2.4 Summary
Bluetooth security in the past has been adequate for the users of
Bluetooth. It provides users with the basic security services of authentication,
access control, data confidentiality, data integrity, and non-repudiation. The
current key exchange scheme may not be adequate in the near future as
Bluetooth becomes commonly used for transferring important and confidential
information. The key generation and key exchange process can be a weak link in
the Bluetooth security architecture, which could lead to the leaking of confidential
information.
The main objective of an attack on the key exchange portion of Bluetooth
security is to obtain the link key that is created. The three types of attack
described above are the main ways to obtain a link key from two unsuspecting
Bluetooth devices. As can be seen from the above explanations the security of
the key exchange depends purely on the secrecy of the PIN. Most Bluetooth
users tend to use easy PINs and therefore making it not too difficult to crack the
PIN. For example in 2005 it was found that to crack a 4-digit PIN on Pentium IV
computer took only 0.063 seconds [22].
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3. Recent Work on Bluetooth Key
Exchange
A new proposal was introduced in 2004 to improve the Bluetooth key
exchange scheme by Selim Aissi, Christian Gehrmann, and Kaisa Nyberg [23].
The authors of this protocol were from Intel, Ericsson and Nokia. This protocol
proposed to use Diffie-Hellman in order to exchange the link keys between two
Bluetooth devices. This protocol uses Diffie-Hellman and Hash functions to
enhance the security of the link key while still allowing devices to have userfriendly PINs. It would provide strong protection against off-line attacks (passive
eavesdropping), active eavesdropping and bluedumping.

3.1 Security Enhancement Using DH scheme
The Diffie-Hellman scheme was first published by Whitfield Diffie and
Martin Hellman in 1976 [24]. The paper was the first that clearly defined publickey cryptography. The objective of Diffie-Hellman is to enable two users to safely
exchange a key that can be used later for encryption of messages. The following
steps are taken to exchange a key using Diffie-Hellman [25]:
1. A prime number q is selected and given to both users
2. a is chosen which is smaller than q; a must be a primitive root of q
and given to both users
3. User A selects private key XA
4. User A calculates public key YA= (aAXA) mod q
5. User A sends YA to User B
6. User B selects private key XB
7. User A calculates public key YB=

(QAXB)

mod q
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8. User B sends YB to User A
9. User A generates secret key S = (YBAXA) mod q
10. User B generates secret key S = (YAAXB) mod q
Once these steps are completed both users have the shared secret key S which
can now be used for encryption of messages the users would like to send to one
another. The use of private and public keys makes this scheme less susceptible
to certain types of attacks.
The Diffie-Hellman enhanced key exchange protocol makes use of
cryptographic one-way functions and hash functions to protect it from certain
types of attacks. Although it does increase the number of protocol steps from 3 to
4, the level of security is increased. The DH protocol consists of two stages the
registration stage and the key establishment stage. The registration stage
contains the initial key generation, exchange of identities, and exchange of
cryptographic verification values [23]. The key establishment stage consists of
the DH key exchange. [23] The steps of the protocol are shown in Figure 3.1 and
3.2.

BDl
Phase I:
generates x = DH Key
computes gx = public key
Generates K=RND
Computes C=MAC(K,gx)
stores x, gx, K, C, IDBD2

enters PIN

BD2

Stores C, K, IDBD1

enters PIN

Figure 3.1: Enhanced BT Key exchange using DH Phase 1
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Phase 1 will take place at Bluetooth Device 1. It starts off with Bluetooth
device 1 (BD1) generating its private key x. After the generation of its private key,
BD1 computes the public key gx mod q. BD1 now needs to generate a random
number for the authentication key (K) which will be used as the key to the MAC
function. The next step for BD1 is to generate a message digest using a MAC
function. The message digest is created by using the K as the key and the
message used to create the message digest is gx. Once all these steps are taken
care of, BD1 will store x, gx, K, C, and IDBD2. BD1 will securely transfer the
values of C and K to BD2 using its online interface. User of BD2 will enter these
values into its device and store them.
Prior to the beginning of phase 2 several steps need to be taken. First of
all, both users for the Bluetooth devices need to agree upon a PIN. Once the PIN
has been agreed upon, the users enter the PINs into their respective Bluetooth
devices. Once the PINs have been verified, the connection is established. The
next step is for BD2 to send its address (IDBD2) to BD1. In return, BD1 will send
a message to BD2 containing its public key (gx) and its address (IDBD1). BD2 will
now try to compute the same message digest as BD1 by using the key it received
earlier (K) and the gx it was sent (C = MAC(K,gx)). After the computation, BD2
will compare the calculated C to the C it has stored. If both values are the same
then BD2 will send a success message to BD1.
Phase 2 can now start after the C and C have been confirmed to be the
same. At the beginning of phase 2, BD2 generates it private key, y. BD2 will now
use this key to generate its public key (gy mod q). After the calculation of the
public key, BD2 will compute a key (K') by using the key derivation function
(KDF). The KDF is simply a hash function which takes as input a variable size
message and outputs a fixed size message. BD2 will compute K' by using the
authentication key (K' = KDF(K)). BD2 will finally calculate the link key using all
the values it has. The link key is also calculated by using the key derivation
function (KLink = KDF(PIN,S, C K, IDBD1, IDBD2)). After all these steps have
been completed, BD2 sends a message to BD1 containing gy and

EK(K,IDBD2).
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EK(K,IDBD2) is simply an XOR encryption function that is encrypting K and
IDBD2 using K' as the key. At the conclusion of this step phase 2 is finished.

BD2

BDl
Establish Connection
BD2 Sends IDBD2
BDl Sends gx, IDBD1
Success (C=C)

Phase III:
Computes S=gxy =DH Shared
Computes K'=KDF(S)
Computes Klink=KDF (PIN,S, C K,
IDBD1,IDBD2)
Decrypts received EK(S,IDBD2)
if decrypted K = stored K then
accept KLink

BD2 sends gy,
Er(S,IDBD2)

Computes C = MAC(K,gx)
Compares C and C
Phase II:
Generates y=RND=DH Key
Computes S=gxy =DH Shared
Computes K'=KDF(S)
Computes Kiink=KDF (PIN.S, C
K,IDBD1,IDBD2)

Figure 3.2: Enhanced BT Key exchange using DH Phase 2and 3
Phase 3 begins with BD1 computing K' in the same way that BD2 did (K' =
KDF(K)). After the calculation of K', BD1 will generate the link key once again in
the same manner as BD2 (KLink = KDF(PIN,S, C K, IDBD1, IDBD2)). The final
calculation for BD1 is to decrypt the message that was sent by BD2
(E(c(K,IDBD2)) to recover the value of K. When BD1 recovers the value of K it will
compare it to the stored value of K it has. If the stored value of K matches the
decrypted value of K then BD1 will accept the value of Kunk-
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3.2 Security Analysis
The Diffie-Hellman protocol was proposed in order to avoid the security
risks present in the original Bluetooth key exchange scheme. As was mentioned
earlier,

the

main

security

threats

were

passive

eavesdropping,

active

eavesdropping, and bluedumping.
In the passive eavesdropping attack, the attacker will not be changing any
messages. They will just be trying to obtain the link key by observing the
messages being sent from one device to the other. In the Diffie-Hellman protocol,
the only entities that are exchanged publicly are g x , g y , IDBD1, IDBD2,
E K (S,IDBD2), and a success signal. The information that an attacker needs to
obtain the link key is PIN, S, C K, IDBD1, and IDBD2. An eavesdropper would be
able to obtain IDBD1 and IDBD2 by simply listening to the conversation. The PIN
of course is again a problem. The attacker needs to be able to guess the PIN
somehow because there is no real way to calculate it unless you go through all
possibilities. The shared secret S is also a problem because the attacker will
need to find out either user 1's or user 2's private key in order to calculate S.
Since these values are generated randomly, it would be quite difficult.

The

values of C and K are usually exchanged between the two devices right when
they discover one another and an attacker would have to be present and waiting
for these devices to connect to be able to get these values. Another option would
be for the user to enter the values of C and K to the second BT device using
human operable interface [23]. This way it would not be possible for the hacker to
obtain these values. The Diffie-Hellman enhanced protocol would completely
eliminate the possibility of an off-line attack by using the Diffie-Hellman Key
Exchange and Hash functions.
The active eavesdropping attack would have a greater chance of success
in this protocol. However, it would be quite difficult. The main issue in the man-inthe-middle attack would be the discovery of the values of C and K and then using
those values to manipulate the DH public key to match those values. Of course,
first and foremost, if the attacker is unable to obtain the PIN then the attack will
be useless. In the DH protocol when BD1 sends g x to BD2, an active
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eavesdropper would intercept this and for a successful attack would need to find
another public key that would give the same value of C. If somehow the attacker
is able to obtain the values of K and C, this would become much easier. The
values of K and C are exchanged very early and again the attacker would have to
be present as soon as the two devices discover one another. Another precaution
would be for BD1 to send the K and C to BD2 using its output interface and the
user of BD2 would enter the information into the device using the human
operable interface [23]. With these precautions although it is possible for a manin-the-middle attack to work, it is highly unlikely.
Bluedumping, as was explained earlier, is a combination of active and
passive eavesdropping [21]. The main portion of this attack relies on initiating a
new key exchange and then listening to the messages being exchanged. The
attacker will force the two devices to discard their link keys and start a new key
exchange. However, it is not necessary for the devices to change any of the
values they used previously. If new values are not created for everything, then
the attacker will have an even smaller chance of obtaining the link key because
the K and C values do not need to be transferred from one device to the other. If
new values of K and C are used again it will be quite difficult for the attacker to
obtain these if they are being entered into the Bluetooth device using the human
operable interface. At the end the success of the bluedumping attack depends on
the same factors as the passive eavesdropping attack.

3.3 Problems in Recent Work for BT Key Exchange
Although it does provide better security than the original Bluetooth key
exchange, there are some issues with this protocol that could make it undesirable
for some users. As the protocol diagram shows, each user is required to carry out
the same amount of computation which can be a problem when one device has a
processor that is much slower or smaller than the other. For example, if a laptop
is communicating with a handheld device (cell phone, PDA, etc.), this protocol
could cause significant delay at the handheld device end and the laptop would
just have to wait. Another issue would be the increased amount of computations,
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each user is to perform two modular exponentiations during each key exchange
again this would cause significant delays at the end of the handheld device. The
result of these problems would be significant delay for the users with slower or
less powerful processors which is quite tedious for the user that is trying to
communicate with them.

3.4 Summary
The Diffie-Hellman protocol was able to address some of the issues with
the original Bluetooth key exchange scheme. This protocol was able to provide
high security against the passive eavesdropping, active eavesdropping, and
bluedumping attacks. Although this is a very good feature, it did suffer from some
undesirable features as well. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol will
require each Bluetooth device to perform two exponentiations, which will greatly
increase the difficulty of calculations required as well as the computation time.
Another issue would be that smaller and slower processors have to perform
exactly the same computations as their powerful counterparts, which can cause
an even longer delay. In the next chapter another algorithm is introduced called
"Unbalanced RSA" which addresses the problems related to the Diffie-Hellman
protocol.
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4. RSA and its Modified Version
This chapter will first go over the basics of the RSA algorithm followed by
an explanation of the modified version of RSA called "Unbalanced RSA". Finally
the security features of both RSA and Unbalanced RSA will be reviewed.

4.1 RSA
RSA was publicly described the first time in 1977 in a paper written by
Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman for Communications of the ACM [26]. RSA has
become the most popular approach to public-key encryption. The RSA algorithm
consists of five main entities shown in the table below.
Entity

Description

n

Modulus (public)

p. q
e

Prime factors of modulus n (private)

d

Private Key (private)

Public key (public)

Tab e4.1: RSA entities
The RSA algorithm is shown in Figure 6.1 on the next page. The figure shows the
basic idea on how RSA works. One user (User A) will select two prime numbers p
and q. Using those numbers he will calculate its public and private key. User A
will then broadcast its public key so User B can obtain it. User B will select a
message and encrypt it using User A's public key (e) then send the cipher text to
User A. User A will decrypt the ciphertext using its private key to obtain the
message.
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Key Generation
Select p, q

p and q are prime

Calculate n = p x q
Calculate 0(n) = (p-1)(q-1)
Select integer e
Calculate d

gcd(<Kn),e)=1;Ke<<|>(n)
e*d=1 mod <|>(n)

Public key

KU = {e,n}

Private key

KR = {d,p,q}

Encryption
Plaintext:

M <n

Ciphertext:

C = Me mod n

Decryption
Ciphertext

C

Plaintext:

M = Cd mod n
Figure 4.1: RSA Algorithm [27]

4.2 "Unbalanced RSA"
"Unbalanced RSA" (URSA) was introduced in a paper called "RSA for
paranoids" by Adi Shamir in 1995 [28]. In 1995, a modulus size of 512 bits for
RSA started to become considerably insecure. However, if the modulus size was
increased some problems could arise. Firstly, by increasing the modulus size, the
computation complexity and delay would rise very quickly and thus make it
difficult to choose a modulus size that is efficient and will provide long term
security. For example, if an RSA encryption operation with a 1024 bit modulus
takes 1 second, then the same encryption operation with a 5120 bit modulus on
the same processors would take approximately 2 minutes. Unbalanced RSA will
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allow people to increase the modulus size to improve security without any time
penalty. Unbalanced RSA can also be used to keep the modulus size the same
and decrease the computation time when compared to RSA.
In the explanation of "Unbalanced RSA" a modulus size of 1024 bits will be
used as an example as this value is considered a common value for RSA
modulus. In normal RSA the prime factors for such a modulus would be 512 bits
each. In Unbalanced RSA however, the two prime factors p and q are 256 and
768 bits in length respectively. This difference in the size of the prime factors is
what is being referenced in the name "Unbalanced RSA". A later discussion will
show why a 1024 bit modulus and its factors of size 256 and 768 in Unbalanced
RSA are still as secure as normal RSA with its 512 bit factors.
RSA is usually used to exchange keys for symmetric cryptosystems
therefore the cleartexts that are being encrypted are usually quite short. Looking
at the earlier example of p which was 256 bits, it is very unlikely that someone
would use RSA to exchange a key greater than 256 bits. Even three keys for
3DES require only 168 bits [28]. An assumption can be made that the cleartext
that needs to be encrypted is in the range of 0 to p.
When comparing RSA to Unbalanced RSA one only needs to consider the
decryption operation because the encryption operation remains the same in both
cases. In normal RSA, decryption is performed by M = Cd mod n. In Unbalanced
RSA, decryption is by performed M = Cd mod p. If RSA decryption and
Unbalanced RSA decryption is compared it will show that the moduli are 1024
bits and 256 bits respectively. Using these two moduli it can be shown that the
decryption in RSA will take (1024/256)3=64 times longer than that of URSA [28].
The decryption process of Unbalanced RSA is based on the use of the
Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). In normal RSA when trying to decrypt the
ciphertext using CRT is the most efficient way to do so [29]. The process is split
up to calculate Mi=Cd mod p and M2 = Cd mod q, where p and q are of the same
size. For the URSA case where p is 256 bits and q is 768 bits, the calculation of
M2 would take (768/256)3 = 27 times as long as the calculation of Mi. The
purpose of this discussion was to show there is no need to calculate the much
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more expensive M2. Since the size of the message M is smaller than p, it can be
concluded that M-i is simply equal to M. This would mean that there is no need to
calculate the much more expensive M2 in order to retrieve the original message.

4.3 RSA and "Unbalanced RSA" Security Analysis
RSA security is mainly dependant on the ability of an attacker to factor the
modulus n into its prime factors, p and q. These days a normal accepted value of
an RSA modulus is 1024 bits making the two prime factors 512 bits each. There
are two types of factoring algorithms that can be used on the modulus of RSA.
The first type of algorithm is one whose running time depends on the size of the
factors (Type 1) and the second type of algorithm is one whose running time
depends on the size of the factored number, n (Type 2).
The fastest factoring algorithm which depends on the size of the factors is
the elliptic curve method. This method was invented by Lenstra in 1987 [30], it
was an improvement on the p-1 method put forward by Pollard [31]. The
asymptotic running time of this method is exp(0((ln(p))°5- (lnln(p))05)) [28].
However, the basic operations of this method are very slow. In 1995 the largest
factor ever found using the elliptic curve method was 145 bits long. The largest
factor ever found so far using ECM was 67 digits long [32]. According to Paul
Zimmerman, using the elliptic curve method should find factors 70 digits long by
2010 and 85 digits long by 2018 [33]. Therefore, in the near future, it will be very
unlikely the elliptic curve method will be able to find factors 256 or 512 bits long.
Factoring algorithms that depend on the size of the factored number are
much faster because they can use a variety of mathematical techniques. The
best algorithm of this type is called the general number field sieve. This method
consists of a sieving step and a matrix step [34]. This algorithm has an
asymptotic complexity of exp(0((ln(n))1/3- (\n\r\(n))m)) and is said to be able to
factor a 512 bit modulus 10,000 - 15,000 MlPS-years (1 MlPS-years is about
31.5 trillion instructions) [28].
Since RSA was introduced all major factorizations of the modulus have
been achieved by the algorithms depending on the size of the modulus. It can be

29

assumed that this trend will continue in the future. The earlier example has
Unbalanced RSA with the modulus size 1024 bits and the size of p is 256 bits,
whereas RSA has n being 1024 bits and p being 512 bits. By looking at the
results of these factoring algorithms it is safe to say that the sizes chosen for the
URSA entities provide the same level of security as the RSA entities. Since the
largest factored numbers using ECM is 67 digits long, the p value which 256 bits
in "Unbalanced RSA" is just as safe as the 512 bit value of RSA. The second type
of algorithm depends on the size of the modulus and since both RSA and
Unbalanced RSA have a modulus size of 1024 bits, they are equally secure to
this type of algorithm.
By looking at these facts one can say that the "Unbalanced RSA"
algorithm can be kept as secure as regular RSA if certain conditions are met. If
the modulus, n, of both algorithms is of the same size then RSA and URSA will
not be susceptible to a type 2 algorithm because the size of their moduli is the
same. Now since Unbalanced RSA uses the prime factor p as its decryption
modulus, the size of the factor should be greater than 67 digits. This is because
that largest factor found using a type 1 algorithm is 67 digits long. As long as
these conditions are met, using Unbalanced RSA should not compromise the
security when comparing it to normal RSA.

4.4 Application of Unbalanced RSA
Unbalanced RSA has been proposed to be applied to other wireless
areas. In [35], [36], it is proposed to use Unbalanced RSA for authentication and
key distribution in Wireless Local Area Networks. Public-key cryptography needs
to be used in WLAN because it also suffers from the same security threats as
Bluetooth (passive and active eavesdropping) [37]. The main idea of this
proposal was for the client and server in the communication to exchange
certificates and a shared secret key. The first step is for the client to send its
certificate to the server, the server will verify the certificate authority's signature
on the certificate and if approved it will move forward. The server will generate a
random secret key and encrypt it with the client's public key. This ciphertext
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would be sent to the client along with the server's certificate. The client will now
verify the server's certificate and if approved will decrypt the ciphertext to obtain
the secret key. Once both the client and server have the secret key a finished
message is sent from client to server. This protocol using Unbalanced RSA
addresses the flaws in key-distribution and authentication in the 802.11 standard
and also reduces the time delay for key-distribution.

4.5 Summary
In this chapter the "Unbalanced RSA" algorithm was introduced to show its
advantages over RSA and Diffie-Hellman. The purpose of "Unbalanced RSA" is
to decrease the size of decryption modulus in order to reduce computation time,
while providing the same security level. For example, it was shown that the
decryption process for "Unbalanced RSA" was 64 times shorter than that of RSA
when both have a modulus of 1024 bits. "Unbalanced RSA" can also be used to
greatly increase the security level, by increasing the size of n, while keeping the
same computation time as RSA. Another advantage of "Unbalanced RSA" is that
it can be used to let slower and smaller processor do the decryption portion of the
algorithm so that they don't have to deal with the large modulus size.
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5. Proposed Bluetooth Key
Exchange with Unbalanced RSA
In this chapter the proposed protocol will be introduced. "Unbalanced
RSA" will be applied to the Bluetooth Key exchange in order to improve the
security from the original Bluetooth scheme and reduce computation time and
reduce the number of exponentiations from the Diffie-Hellman protocol. The first
section will describe the proposed protocol in detail using its three separate
phases. The next section will describe how the security features of the protocol
defend against the common key exchange attacks discussed earlier. Lastly the
three key exchange protocols in various fields will be compared.

5.1 The Proposed Protocol
First of all, there are two scenarios that can take place during Bluetooth
communication. The first scenario is when both devices have human operable
interfaces or there can be a communication between two devices one of which
has no human operable interface. The device with no human operable interface
should have a suitable output interface so that it can display important values to
the other device. The public keys and message digest are securely transferred to
each device at the very beginning of the connection between the two devices.
The proposed protocol consists of three messages being exchanged
between Bluetooth Device 1 (BD1) and Bluetooth Device 2 (BD2). Other than
these messages there are several calculations that take place at each device.
There are some variables and abbreviations that will be used during this
discussion. In Table 5.1 below are descriptions of all these items.
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e2, d2

Public key, Private key pair for BT device 2

n

Modulus used for RSA

p. q

prime factors of modulus n

Hash

MD5 Hash function

MAC

Message authentication code. Input is secret
key and message, output is MAC

RND

Random number generator
Table 5.1: proposed protocol entities

The public key of BD2 is used only by BD1. BD1 will perform an encryption
function; BD2 will perform a decryption function. Both devices need to perform 2
Hash functions and 1 MAC function. Only BD1 will need to generate random
numbers using the random number generator. Figure's 5.1 and 5.2 show the
protocol along with all its steps divided into 3 phases.

5.1.1 Phase 1
First and foremost, the public key of BD2 is given to BD1 secretly as soon
as the two devices decide to connect to one another but prior to the entry of the
PIN. So for example when BD1 discovers BD2 as soon as BD1 chooses to
connect to BD2 and BD2 accepts, the public key of BD2 (e and n) is sent to BD1.
Phase 1 (Figure 5.1) of the protocol takes place before the users enter the PINs
into both BT devices. Phase 1 mainly consists of operations/calculations that do
not require values from BD2. BD1 will firstly generate a 128-bit random number
(K) to use as the initialization key. This key will then be encrypted using the public
key of BD2 (C = (KAe2) mod n). A message digest is calculated using the
initialization key (K) and the ciphertext C. This message digest will be used later
for authentication. Once all these values are calculated, BD1 will store K, H, C,
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and e2. The message digest is secretly sent to the user of BD2. BD2 will store the
value of H to use at a later time for authentication. Once these operations are
finished both users have agreed to a PIN and enter the PIN into their respective
Bluetooth enabled devices.
BDl

BD 2

Phase I:
generates K=RND
computes C=(KAe2) mod n
computes H=MAC(K, C)
stores K, H, C, e2
stores H

enters PIN

enters PIN

Figure 5.1: Enhanced BT Key exchange using URSA Phase 1

5.1.2 Phase 2
After the PINs have been entered, two messages need to be exchanged
between the users to enable further calculations. BD2 will send its 48-bit address
to BD1 and BD1 in return will send its address along with the ciphertext, C. Once
these messages have been exchanged, phase 2 of the protocol can begin.
Phase 2 takes place entirely on the side of BD2. Firstly, BD2 will decrypt the
ciphertext to obtain the initialization key. As can be seen in Figure 5.2, the
decryption process is done by using modulus p hence "Unbalanced RSA" is
being used. After decrypting the ciphertext, BD2 will compute an H' using the
random key K which was just decrypted and the ciphertext, which was just
delivered to it following Phase 1. Once H' is calculated, BD2 will then compare
this value to the H that it was given during the end of phase 1. If H and H' are the
same, then BD2 knows that it is communicating with BD1 and no changes have
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been made to the messages being sent. If H and H' did not match BD2 would
simply shut down the communication and the key exchange would be cancelled
at that point. Once the message digests match, then the initialization key is used
to create another key, K'. This key is generated by using the initialization key (K)
as input to the MD5 hash function. This K' is then XORed with H' and the address
of BD2 and this value is sent to BD1. The last step in phase 2 is to generate the
link key which will be used later to obtain an encryption key. The link key, K|ink, is
generated by entering several values into the MD5 Hash function. The inputs to
the Hash function are the PIN, K, H, IDBD1, and IDBD2. As can be seen, all
these values are very important to the generation of the link key and a small error
in any one of them will cause the devices to have two different link keys. That is
why these values all need to be checked to ensure their correctness.
BDl

BD2
Establish Connection
BD2 Sends IDBD2
BDl Sends C, IDBD1

Phase III:
computes K'=Hash (K)
Store K'
KLink=Hash(PIN,K,H,IDBD 1,
IDBD2)
Recovers K' from (K' XOR H'
XORIDBD2)
compares recovered K' to stored K'
if K'=Stored K' then Accept KLink

BD2 sends (K' XOR H'
XOR IDBD2)

Phase II:
decrypts C: K=(CAd2) mod p
computes H'=MAC(K,C)
compares H and H' to confirm
BDl's identity
computes K'=Hash (K)
BD2 computes (K' XOR H' XOR
IDBD2)
KLi„k=Hash(PIN,K>H,IDBD 1 ,IDB
D2)

Figure 5.2: Enhanced BT Key exchange using URSA Phase 2 and 3

5.1.3 Phase 3
Phase 3 is also shown is Figure 5.2 and will begin prior to the message
being sent by BD2 to BD1 containing the (K' XOR H' XOR IDBD2) value. The first
step in phase 3 is to generate the same K' as was done in phase 2. This was
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done by placing the initialization key (K) into the hash function. Once the K' is
calculated then BD1 can go on and generate the link key. Once again, this is
done in the same manner as BD2 where the values of the PIN, K, H, IDBD1, and
IDBD2 are used as input to the hash function and the output is K|ink- The next
step in phase 3 is to recover the value of K' from the message that was sent by
BD2 earlier. This is done by XORing the message with H and IDBD2. Once K' is
recovered, BD1 will check to see if the K' that was recovered from the message
is the same K' that was calculated earlier through the hash function. If they are
the same then BD1 knows that BD2 received the proper value of the initialization
key or else they could not calculate the same K'. After having gone through the
entire protocol, both devices know they have the correct values so they can now
accept the K|ink value and continue with the security process after the key
exchange.

5.2 Security analysis
The proposed protocol possesses many of the same security properties as
the Diffie-Hellman protocol. The proposed protocol provides high security against
the common attacks of passive eavesdropping, active eavesdropping and
bluedumping. As explained earlier the proposed protocol will exchange certain
values (H and public keys) secretly prior to the entry of the PIN. The combination
of public-key cryptography as well as HASH/MAC functions provides enough
security for the near future.
The passive eavesdropping attack would be almost useless against this
protocol. As explained earlier certain values are exchanged secretly before entry
of the PIN. Even if these values were to somehow get compromised a passive
eavesdropping attack would still be almost impossible. In order to have a
successful passive attack the attacker would need to obtain the values of H, K,
PIN, IDBD1, and IDBD2. The values of IDBD1 and IDBD2 can be obtained by
listening to the messages sent by BD1 and BD2 to one another. The other
information an attacker would be able to gather is the value of the ciphertext, C,
and the value of (K' XOR H XOR IDBD2). An attacker will not be able to obtain
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the value of the initialization key K from C because it can only be properly
decrypted with the private key of BD2. Since the attacker cannot obtain K it
therefore cannot obtain K' because in order to get K', K is to be entered into to
the Hash function. K' is needed to be able to recover the value of H from the
message of (K' XOR H' XOR IDBD2). Then the attacker still has the issue of
somehow finding out the PIN value. One can see that passive eavesdropper
would have an almost impossible time trying to obtain these values so that he
could put them into the Hash function to get the link key.
An active eavesdropping attack has a better chance of success than a
passive one but still will have a difficult time. The success of the active
eavesdropping attack will mainly depend on the attacker being able to get the
right value for the message digest. Since the value of H and e is exchanged prior
to PIN entry is extremely difficult for the attacker to retrieve these. Even if the
attacker can somehow obtain these values, the attacker has to be anticipating
when the devices will choose to make a connection. But since the attacker is
focusing on the Bluetooth exchange it will be difficult to obtain the public keys and
H. The attacker will intercept the message being sent from BD1 to BD2 which
contains the value of C. Now the attacker needs to ensure that the value of C it
will send to BD2 has the same MAC value as H using K as the key. The attacker
will have no knowledge of the values of H or K making it very unlikely he/she can
produce a C having the same message digest value. If the attacker sends an
incorrect value of C to BD2 then it will cause BD2 to shut down the key exchange
because it will know someone is altering the messages. If the attacker does find
out the value of C then there is still the problem of finding the PIN and the
initialization key. In order for an active eavesdropping attack to succeed, the
attacker will need to find out all of these values, which will make it quite difficult
as shown in the discussion above.
The bluedumping attack is somewhat of a combination between passive
and active eavesdropping. An attacker will send a message to a Bluetooth device
pretending to be another device and claiming to have lost the link key the devices
shared. This will force the two devices to reinitiate the link key exchange [21].
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However, once the two devices start the key exchange, the attacker becomes a
passive eavesdropper and therefore can only listen to the messages being sent.
Again the two devices will exchange values prior to PIN entry using their
interfaces and in some cases may not need to exchange these values if they do
not wish to renew them. The attacker now faces the same problems as the
passive eavesdropping attack and therefore it will be highly unlikely that the
attacker can obtain the link key in the end.
As one can see, the Unbalanced RSA enhanced Bluetooth key exchange
protocol has not lost any security features when compared to the enhanced
Diffie-Hellman Key exchange protocol. Both protocols can fend off the three main
key exchange attacks by using their public-key systems and hash functions. In
the simulation section, Unbalanced RSA and Diffie-Hellman will be compared to
see if the proposed protocol can outperform the DH protocol in terms of
computation time.
5.3 Comparing the Three Protocols
Table 5.2 compares the original Bluetooth key exchange, the DiffieHellman protocol and the proposed protocol ("Unbalanced RSA") in several
different areas.
The first row compares the three protocols in terms of their security
strength. When the description of the original key exchange scheme was given it
was shown how it is quite susceptible to the common attacks of passive
eavesdropping, active eavesdropping, and bluedumping [16]. On the other hand
the Diffie-Hellman [23] and proposed protocols were shown to have very high
security against these attacks by using one-way cryptographic functions and
hash functions. Therefore, the security strength of the original scheme is low
while the other two protocols have high security strength.
The entities that are kept secret by each protocol also differ. The original
scheme will keep only the PIN as the secret everything else will be sent to the
other device in plaintext. The Diffie-Hellman protocol will keep the PIN secret as
well as the shared secret key S using Diffie-Hellman. This protocol will also keep
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the message digest a secret along with the key used to create it. The
"Unbalanced RSA" protocol will keep the PIN secret as well as the key
exchanged using RSA, just like the Diffie-Hellman protocol the message digest
and its key should also be kept secret.
Original Scheme Diffie -Hellman

"Unbalanced
RSA"

Security
Strength

Low

High

High

Secret Entities

PIN

PIN,S

PIN, Kmit

Computation

Adequate

Inadequate

Adequate

3

4

3

Time (delay)
Protocol Steps

Table 5.2: Comparing three key exchange protocols
The computation time will be related to how difficult the computations are
for each protocol. The original scheme has relatively simple computations. In the
original key exchange scheme only symmetric ciphers are used, more specifically
SAFER+. SAFER+ was a candidate for the advanced encryption standard (AES)
eventually losing out to Rjindael after three years of testing [38]. The reason for
the use of SAFER+ was its practical implementation in hardware [39]. The DiffieHellman protocol will have a relatively high computation time because of all the
modular exponentiations being done on both sides. In the case of the DH
enhanced protocol it would require four modular exponentiations in the entire
protocol all with the same size modulus [25]. The proposed protocol should be
closer to the original scheme in terms of computation time. The encryption and
decryption portion of the protocol should take the most time. Usually encryption is
much faster than decryption in RSA however, with the "Unbalanced RSA" version
the decryption time will be considerably smaller and should make the
computation time adequate. If one of the devices in a Bluetooth communication is
a much smaller processor the Diffie-Hellman protocol would cause an even larger
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delay, the Unbalanced RSA protocol can cure that problem. The Diffie-Hellman
protocol and the proposed protocol will be simulated for the computation time.

BT Device 1

BT Device 2

Rinit

Ci

c2
Figure 5.3: Original BT key exchange messages

The last comparison between these three protocols is made in terms of the
protocol steps. In the original protocol only 3 messages are exchanged between
the two Bluetooth devices during the key exchange as shown in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.3 shows the number of messages needed to be exchanged in the
proposed protocol using "Unbalanced RSA". The diagram shows that the
proposed protocol only uses 3 messages as well, same as the original Bluetooth
key exchange scheme. The proposed protocol is therefore increasing the security
from the original Bluetooth key exchange protocol without changing the number
of protocol steps needed.
Figure 5.4 shows that the Diffie-Hellman protocol requires 4 messages to
be exchanged, in order to complete the protocol. The Proposed protocol requires
only 3 messages as can be seen in Figure 5.3 to be exchanged in order for the
protocol to be completed. In the end the proposed protocol does not even
increase the number of protocol steps in order to increase the security, whereas
the Diffie-Hellman protocol increases the security same as the proposed protocol
but needs to add one extra protocol step. Although this may not make a huge
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difference in the overall design of the key exchange it does increase the
complexity and will also increase the overall delay of the process.

BT Device 1

BT Device 2

BD2 sends IDBD2
*

BD1 sends C, IDBD1
2

•

BD2 sends (K' XOR
H' XOR IDBD2)
4

Figure 5.4: Enhanced "Unbalanced RSA" Key Exchange Messages

BT Device 1

BT Device 2

BD2 sends IDBD2
«

BD1 sends gx, IDBD1
»

Success (C=C)
4

BD2 sends gy, EK>(S,
IDBD2)
4

Figure 5.5: Enhanced Diffie-Hellman Key exchange messages
Comparing these three key exchange protocol in these four fields shows
how successful they are. The "Unbalanced RSA" protocol is better than the Diffie-
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Hellman protocol in terms computation time, and the number of protocol steps.
These two protocols do however provide high security strength and have the
same number of secret entities. The Unbalanced RSA protocol provides higher
security strength than the original key exchange scheme and also keeps more
entities a secret. They both have an adequate computation time and the same
number of protocol steps. The only area where the Unbalanced RSA protocol
would suffer is when it is compared to the original key exchange in terms of how
complex the operations are in each protocol because the proposed protocol uses
a public-key system, whereas the original scheme uses a much simpler
symmetric cipher.
5.4 Summary
This chapter introduced the new protocol using the "Unbalanced RSA"
Algorithm. The goal of the proposed protocol was similar to that of applying
Unbalanced RSA to WLAN [35], [36], which was to improve security while trying
to minimize delay. The proposed protocol provides better security features than
the original scheme when related to the common key exchange attacks. The
proposed protocol also improves the previously discussed Diffie-Hellman protocol
by having a lower computation time. This protocol will require each user to
perform only one modular exponentiation. Also the powerful processor can take
care of the encryption because it has to handle the entire modulus while the other
processor can take care of the decryption because it only needs to handle the
prime factor, p. The next chapter will compare the Diffie-Hellman protocol, the
proposed protocol, and an RSA protocol in terms of their time delay. As the
complexity of the operations in the protocol and the computation time are related,
some vital information should be obtained from the simulations run on these key
exchange protocols.
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6. Simulation Results and Analysis
The simulation was performed to check and see how long each protocol
would take to go through its phases. Simulation results were performed on the
Diffie-Hellman protocol, the "Unbalanced RSA" protocol, and a protocol exactly
the same as the proposed protocol but using RSA. The simulation was performed
for modulus sizes of 1024 bits and 2048 bits. In the URSA protocol, the size of p
when n is 1024 bits was 256 bits, making q 768 bits. When n was 2048 bits, the
size of p was 512 bits, making q 1536 bits. The reason for choosing these values
was because as shown in [32], [33] they should be secure for the foreseeable
future. The modular exponentiation was performed using the square-and-multiply
method as it is one of the most popular methods to use. Simulation was
performed using MAPLE version 11 on a laptop with a core duo processor with a
2GB RAM and 2GHz clock frequency. The codes for the simulations are provided
in the appendices along with comments to explain how they work.

6.1 Simulation Results
The simulation results were performed in phases as shown in the
diagrams for the protocols earlier. In the Diffie-Hellman protocol phase 1 consists
of a modular exponentiation and a MAC function; Phase 2 consists of two
modular exponentiations and two hash functions; and finally Phase 3 consists of
two hash functions. In the RSA/Unbalanced RSA protocol Phase 1 consists of an
encryption operation and a MAC function; Phase 2 consists of a decryption
operation, a MAC function, and two hash functions; and lastly Phase 3 consists of
two hash functions.
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The results for the running time of these phases are shown in Table
6.1(n=1024 bits) and Table 6.2(n=2048 bits). The results show the amount of
time taken to perform calculations for the entire phase and in brackets it shows
how much of the time of the phase is consumed by the main operation, which in
these cases was the modular exponentiation. These results will be discussed in
more detail later to ensure their validity.

DH

RSA

URSA

Phase I

Phase II

Phase III

(main opr.)

(main opr.)

(main opr.)

3.68 ms

9.02 ms

5.3 ms

(3.46 ms)

(8.76 ms)

(4.98 ms)

.048 ms

3.75 ms

6.4 MS

(.045 ms)

(3.725 ms)

(6.4 MS)

.048 ms

.064 ms

6.4 ps

(.045 ms)

(.0589 ms)

(6.4 MS)

Table 6.1: Delay for DH, RSA, and URSA schemes (n=1024 bits)

DH

RSA

URSA

Phase I

Phase II

Phase III

(main opr.)

(main opr.)

(main opr.)

18.6 ms

48.5 ms

28.2 ms

(18.5 ms)

(48 ms)

(28.1 ms)

.425 ms

32.9 ms

6.4 ps

(.421 ms)

(32.6 ms)

(6.4 MS)

.425 ms

.562 ms

6.4 MS

(.421 ms)

(.552 ms)

(6.4 MS)

Table 6.2: Delay for DH, RSA, and URSA schemes (n=2048 bits)
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By looking at the results in the two tables above, one can clearly see the
advantages "Unbalanced RSA" has over the other two protocols. As explained in
the chapter on "Unbalanced RSA", decreasing the size of one factor does not
compromise the security of the algorithm and therefore the tables provide an
accurate way to compare the protocols [28]. The calculations in each phase were
explained earlier and by looking at the results one can see that Unbalanced RSA
is clearly superior to the other two algorithms when it comes to computation time.
The Diffie-Hellman protocol is clearly the least efficient protocol for either
modulus size. The amount of time it takes in each phase is much greater than
that of RSA or "Unbalanced RSA". The comparison of RSA and "Unbalanced
RSA" is a little bit tricky as in both protocols; Phase 1 and Phase 3 delays are
exactly the same. Phase 1 and Phase 3 is where the encryption and hash
functions take place. However, when looking at phase 2, Unbalanced RSA's
efficiency is much greater than that of RSA. Taking all these results into account,
one can say the "Unbalanced RSA" is the best choice when one needs a
combination of security and efficiency.

6.2 Analysis of Results
The simulation results can be tested by comparing them with Shamir's
discovery that the time delay of a RSA computations grows cubically with the size
of the modulus [28]. Table 6.3 shows the results for the encryption process and
how their time delay ratio compares to that of Shamir's theory. First of all one
should take note that the table shows RSA and Unbalanced RSA have the same
time delay. This is not an error because as mentioned earlier, the encryption
operation does not change between RSA and "Unbalanced RSA". In theory,
when the size of the modulus changes from 1024 bits to 2048 bits, the time delay
should be about (2048/1024 )3=8 times slower. As the table shows the tested time
is about 9.3 times slower which is quite a good estimate when compare to
Shamir's theory.
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Ratio
n = 1024 bits

n = 2048 bits

(Theory)
9.3

RSA

.045 ms

.421 ms

(8)

Unbalanced
RSA

9.3
.045 ms

.421 ms

(8)

Table 6.3: Encryption time delay and ratio (RSA and URSA schemes)
Table 6.4 shows the results of the decryption process and compares the results
to Shamir's theory. As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, when the
modulus is 1024 bits, the p value for URSA is 256 bits, and when the modulus is
2048 bits, the p value for URSA is 512 bits. According to Shamir, when n is 1024
bits, Unbalanced RSA decryption should be (1024/256)3=64 times faster than that
of RSA. In the simulation, results showed Unbalanced RSA to be 63 time faster
than RSA. When n is 2048 bits Unbalanced RSA decryption should also be
(2048/512)3=64 times faster than that of RSA. In the simulation, with modulus
being 2048 bits, results showed Unbalanced RSA decryption to be 59 times
faster than RSA. By looking at these results and comparing them to Shamir's
theoretical results, it can be deduced that the results obtained are valid and make
sense.
n = 1024 bits

n = 2048 bits

RSA

3.725 ms

32.6 ms

Unbalanced RSA

0.0589 ms

.552 ms

Ratio: RSA/URSA

63

59

(Theory)

(64)

(64)

Table 6.4: Decryption time delay and ratio (RSA and URSA schemes)
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6.3 Summary
This chapter displayed and analyzed the results achieved when the DiffieHellman protocol, the proposed protocol, and the RSA protocol were simulated.
By looking at the results it is clear to see that the proposed protocol that uses
Unbalanced RSA has the lowest computation time. The differential between the
proposed protocol and the Diffie-Hellman protocol is enormous whereas
differential between the proposed protocol and RSA is smaller. This is due to the
fact that the only difference that occurs between the proposed protocol and the
RSA protocol is in Phase 2 of the protocol (decryption). Even with this fact, by
looking at just the phase 2 portion of the simulation Unbalanced RSA is much
better than the RSA protocol. The results were validated by showing that they
adhere to Shamir's theory that the RSA computation time is proportional to the
size of the modulus cubed. The results presented in this chapter were obtained
on a laptop and should be considered useful for Bluetooth on laptops only. The
use of the proposed protocols on handhelds would require further investigation
and testing. The next chapter will state some conclusions to the thesis and also
discuss some future work that could be considered for this area.
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7. Conclusions
In this thesis, the problems with IEEE 802.15 standard in terms of key
exchange have been reviewed. New suggestions to the key exchange scheme
and their problems have also been reviewed. The problem of exchanging keys
reliably in a Bluetooth network is very critical. The IEEE standard key exchange
tends to have several security issues when it comes to common attacks
(passive/active eavesdropping, bluedumping). The Enhancement to the key
exchange which uses Diffie-Hellman [23] aimed to help fix these security issues.
The Enhancement using Diffie-Hellman however also had its own problems with
computation time and complex calculations.
In order to find a middle ground between security and efficiency between
two Bluetooth devices, a new protocol is proposed here for Bluetooth key
exchange. The proposed protocol uses a modified version of RSA called
"Unbalanced RSA". If Unbalanced RSA is used, the goal of providing security and
efficiency can be achieved. By using Unbalanced RSA the computation time can
be reduced because in this algorithm the decryption process is done modulo p,
not modulo n as in regular RSA. This fact alone should greatly improve its
efficiency over the Diffie-Hellman protocol. The changing of the modulus for
decryption can affect the security level if one is not careful. There are certain
conditions that need to be met in order for Unbalanced RSA to have the same
security level as regular RSA.
Even though Unbalanced RSA reduces the size of the prime factor p and
uses it as the modulus for decryption, this does not decrease the security level
when compared to normal RSA. A modulus can be divided up into its factors
using two different types of algorithms. The first is dependent upon the size of the
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factored number n and the other is dependent upon the size of the factors. Since
the size of n does not change from RSA to Unbalanced RSA, the first type of
algorithm will not make a difference. The second type of algorithm has only found
factors up to 67 digits so far [32] and is estimated to find 85 digits in the year
2018 [33]. Looking at these facts it is safe to assume that a p size of 256 bits is
still safe for a few years and if needed can even be increased slightly when it is
needed.
By using detailed descriptions and simulations, it was shown that the
proposed protocol using Unbalanced RSA is the best combination of security and
efficiency out of the three protocols. It was shown that the original Bluetooth key
exchange was susceptible to the common key exchange attacks whereas the two
modified version could defend against these attacks. So the original scheme was
deemed to be insecure when compared to the enhanced schemes. The DiffieHellman enhanced protocol and the Unbalanced RSA enhanced protocol were
simulated to check their computation time. At the end, the Unbalanced RSA
protocol was better in terms of computation time than the Diffie-Hellman protocol.
In summary, the proposed key exchange protocol using Unbalanced RSA
was able to increase the security strength when compared to the original
Bluetooth key exchange. It was also able to decrease the computation time when
compared to the enhanced Diffie-Hellman Key exchange. The use of
cryptographic one-way functions and hash functions allows the Unbalanced RSA
key exchange to provide high security against the common key exchange
attacks. The Diffie-Hellman enhanced protocol and the proposed protocol using
Unbalanced RSA are quite similar in terms of their layout. However, a closer look
reveals that the DH enhanced protocol requires twice as many modular
exponentiations than the proposed protocol. Also, one can see the Unbalanced
RSA enhancement keeps the same number of protocol steps as the original key
exchange whereas the DH enhancement increases the number of protocol steps.
The proposed protocol turns out to be a suitable replacement to the
original key exchange scheme and to the Diffie-Hellman enhanced key exchange
protocol. The proposed protocol did perform up to the expectations on the laptop
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on which it was simulated. The results obtained from the simulation are relevant
to laptops and cannot easily be converted to results on handheld processors. It
would be a good idea to implement this proposed protocol on different types of
processors so that it can be seen if this protocol as efficient for other types of
processors. It would be wise to include various types of commercially available
processors for handheld devices as well as other devices, as a greater number of
handhelds come equipped with Bluetooth. The use of elliptic curve cryptography
in Bluetooth security should also be explored. These suggestions can be treated
as future work after this thesis.
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Appendix A: Maple code for BT
Key Exchange using URSA
A . 1 : System Setup
M1 := (rand(2A256))();
M2 := (rand(2A768))();
P := nextprime(MI);
Q := nextprime(M2);
n := P*Q;
n2:=(P-1)*(Q-1);
e:=21e+1;
isprime(e);
gcd(e,n2);
d := eval(1/e mod n2);
IDBD1 := (rand(2A48))();
IDBD2 := (rand(2A48))();

// generates random integer of size 256 bits
// generates random integer of size 768 bits
//finds next prime number after M1
// finds next prime number after M2
//Multiplies P and Q to obtain modulus n
//generates the toitent function
// sets public key value
// check to make sure e is prime
//check to see if e is relatively prime to n2
//evaluate value of d using modular arithmetic
// address for Bluetooth device 1
// address for Bluetooth device 2

A.2: Phase 1 Testing
st := time():
fori from 0 by 1 to 100 do
K:=(rand(2A128))();
C := K&Ae mod n;
end do;
time()-st
This loop will see how long it takes to run phase 1 of the proposed scheme 100
times. He result obtained from this must be divided by 100 to get the actual result
to run phase 1 once. Phase 1 includes 1 exponentiation and 2 random number
generations.
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A.3: Phase 2 Testing
st := time():
with(StringTools):
for i from 0 by 1 to 75 do
C := K&Ae mod p;
K' = Hash(K);
KLink = Hash(PIN,K,H,IDBD1 ,IDBD2);
end do;
time()-st
This loop will see how long it takes to run phase 2 of the proposed scheme 75
times. Since the decryption process will take longer than the encryption we used
a smaller loop. Phase 2 includes 1 exponentiation and 2 hash functions.

A.4: Phase 3 Testing
st := time():
with(StringTools):
for i from 0 by 1 to 1000 do
K" := Hash(K);
KLink := Hash(PIN,K,H,IDBD1,IDBD2);
end do;
time()-st
This loop will see how long it takes to run phase 3 of the proposed scheme 1000
times. We needed to greatly increase the size of the loop because the hash
functions take very little time to execute. Phase 3 includes 2 hash functions.
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Appendix B: Maple code for BT
Key Exchange using RSA
B.1: System Setup
M1 := (rand(2A512))();
M2 := (rand(2A512))();
P := nextprime(MI);
Q := nextprime(M2);
n := P*Q;
n2:=(P-1)*(Q-1);
e : = 2 l 6 + 1;
isprime(e);
gcd(e,n2);
d := eval(1/e mod n2);
IDBD1 := (rand(2M8))();
IDBD2 := (rand(2A48))();

// generates random integer of size 256 bits
// generates random integer of size 768 bits
//finds next prime number after M1
// finds next prime number after M2
//Multiplies P and Q to obtain modulus n
//generates the toitent function
// sets public key value
// check to make sure e is prime
//check to see if e is relatively prime to n2
//evaluate value of d using modular arithmetic
// address for Bluetooth device 1
// address for Bluetooth device 2

B.2: Phase 1 Testing
st := time():
fori from 0 by 1 to 100 do
K := (rand(2A128))();
C := K&Ae mod n;
end do;
time()-st
This loop will see how long it takes to run phase 1 of the RSA key exchange
scheme 100 times. The result obtained from this must be divided by 100 to get
the actual result to run phase 1 once. Phase 1 includes 1 exponentiation and 2
random number generations.
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B.3: Phase 2 Testing
st := time():
with(StringTools):
for i from 0 by 1 to 20 do
K := C&Ad mod n;
K' := Hash(K);
KLink := Hash(PIN,K,H,IDBD1,IDBD2);
end do;
time()-st
This loop will see how long it takes to run phase 2 of the RSA Key exchange
scheme 20 times. Since the decryption process will take longer than the
encryption we used a smaller loop. Phase 2 includes 1 exponentiation and 2
hash functions.

B.4: Phase 3 Testing
st := time():
with(StringTools):
for i from 0 by 1 to 1000 do
K' := Hash(K);
KLink:= Hash(PIN,K,H,IDBD1 JDBD2);
end do;
time()-st
This loop will see how long it takes to run phase 3 of the RSA key exchange
scheme 1000 times. We needed to greatly increase the size of the loop because
the hash functions take very little time to execute. Phase 3 includes 2 hash
functions.
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Appendix C: Maple code for BT
Key Exchange using DH
C.1: System Setup
q1 := (rand(2A1024))();
q := nextprime(q1)
XA := (rand(2A512))();
XB := (rand(2A512))();
IDBD1 := (rand(2A48))();
IDBD2 := (rand(2A48))();

//generates random 1024 bit number
// next prime number after q1 for
modulus
//generates user A private key
//generates user B private key
//User A address
//User B address

for g from 50 to 1000 while a <> q-1 do //selects range from which to get g
with(numtheory);
i := order(g, q);
//finds the proper g as primitive root
g;
//displays alpha value
end do;

C.2: Phase 1 Testing
st := time():
fori from 0 by 1 to 100 do
XA:=(rand(2A512))();
YA := ALPHA&AXA mod q;
K:=(rand(2A128))();
end do;
time()-st
This code will run Phase 1 of the enhanced security using DH. This loop
calculates the time needed to run this phase 100 times. Phase 1 includes 2
random number generations and 1 exponentiation.
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C.3: Phase 2 Testing
st := time():
with(StringTools):
for i from 0 by 1 to 20 do
YA:=(rand(2A512))();
YB := ALPHA&AXB mod q;
S := YB&AXA mod q;
K' = Hash(S);
KLink := Hash(PIN,K,H,S,IDBD1,IDBD2);
end do;
time()-st
This code will run Phase 2 of the enhanced security using DH. This loop
calculates the time needed to run this phase 20 times. Phase 2 includes 2
exponentiations, 1 random number generation and 2 hash functions.

C.4: Phase 3 Testing
st := time():
with(StringTools):
for i from 0 by 1 to 100 do
YA := (rand(2A512))();
S := YA&AXB mod q;
K' = Hash(S);
KLink := Hash(PIN,K,H,S,IDBD1,IDBD2);
end do;
time()-st
This code will run Phase 3 of the enhanced security using DH. This loop
calculates the time needed to run this phase 100 times. Phase 3 includes 1
exponentiation and 2 Hash functions.
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